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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine the rights

of participants in agricultural cooperatives which merge as those
rights are set forth in Section 3-1-30 et seq. UCA.
2.

Did the Court of Appeals in affirming a judgment of

dismissal based upon laches:
(a)

err in that the facts relative to delay were materially

disputed and show genuine issues of fact; and,
(b)

err in that the Defendant IMPA had formally abandoned the

merger?

1

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered in Case
No. 890289-CA.

The Opinion was not published.

A copy thereof is

included as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION
1.

Date of Entry: The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals,

was entered on December 11, 1989.
2.

Order re Extension of Time:

An

Ex Parte Motion

for

Extension of Time to File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was
filed on January 10, 1990, and an order granting a twenty day
extension was entered on January 10, 1990.
3.

Jurisdiction:

Rule 43(3) (4) R. Utah S. Ct. provides

statutory authority to this Court to review the decision in
question.

RELEVANT LAW
1.

Rule 56, (c)(d)(e) U.R.C.P.:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The
motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
A summary judgment,

2

interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If
on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case of for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of motion, by examining
the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material
facts are actually and in good faith
controverted.
It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just.
Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony;
Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge
shall set forth such facts as would be
admissable in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith.
The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed
by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate shall be entered against him.

2.

Title 3, U.C.A. 1953 Text is set forth in its entirety

at Appendix C.
3

3.

Section 3-1-32:
Merger - Contents and approval of plan of
merger.
The board of directors, board of trustees of
other governing board by whatever name
designated, of each party to the merger shall,
by resolution adopted by each such board,
approve a plan of merger setting forth:
(1) the name of the associations
and
corporations proposing to merge, which are
sometimes designate*! in this act collectively
as parties to the merger and singly as a party
to the merger, and the name of the association
or corporation into which they propose to
merge, which is designated in this act as the
surviving corporation;
(2) the terms and conditions of the proposed
merger;
(3) the manner and basis of converting the
stock of shares, if any, of each party to the
merger, into stock, shares or other securities
or obligations of the surviving corporation;
(4) the manner and basis of converting
membership interests, if any, of each party to
the merger into membership interests, stock,
shares or other securities or obligations of
the surviving corporation;
(5) the manner and basis of converting any
certificates of interest, patronage refund
certificates of other interest as members,
patrons or otherwise by whatever name
designated in any fund, capital investment,
savings or reserve of each party to the merger
into stock, shares or other securities or
obligations of or certificates of interest,
patronage refund certificates, or other
interests in any fund, capital investment,
savings
or
reserve
of
the
surviving
corporation, including any changes to be made
in the time and manner of payment of any such
certificates or interests;
(6) a
statement
electing
whether
the
surviving corporation shall be governed by the
Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Association
Act or by the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and
4

Cooperative Association Act. The surviving
corporation shall not be governed by the Utah
Business Corporation Act;
(7) a statement of any changes in the
articles of incorporation of the surviving
corporation to be effected by such merger,
including such changes required by the law
under which the surviving corporation is to be
governed; and
(8) such other provisions with respect to the
proposed merger as are deemed necessary or
desirable.
Section 3-1-33 (second paragraph):
For the purposes of this act, persons holding
certificates of interests, patronage refund
certificates or other interest by whatever
name designated as members, patrons or
otherwise in any fund, capital investment,
savings or reserve of any party to the merger
shall not be considered members, shareholders
or stockholders if the aggregate of such
holdings have a stated or face value of less
than
$50, unless designated
a member,
shareholder or stockholder by the articles of
incorporation
of
the
association
or
corporation in which they have holdings; but,
if the aggregate of such holdings have a
stated face value of $50 or more, such persons
shall be considered members even though not
otherwise designated a member or shareholder
or
stockholder
by
the
articles
of
incorporation or bylaws of the association or
corporation in which they have such holding
and shall be entitled to all rights of members
under this act.
Section 3-1-35 (second paragraph):
After such approval by a vote of the members
and shareholders of each party to the merger
and at any time prior to the filing of the
articles of merger, the merger may be
abandoned pursuant to provisions therefor, if
any, set forth in the plan of merger.
Section 3-1-39:
Merger

- Dissent

from
5

plan

by member

or

shareholder - Dissent as to less than cill of
memberships or shares.
Any member or shareholder of a domestic
association or corporation shall have the
right to dissent from any plan of merger to
which the association or corporation is a
party in accordance with the procedure and at
the times set forth in this act. A member or
shareholder may dissent as to less than all of
the memberships of shares registered in his
name and, in that event, his rights shall be
determined as if the membership or shares as
to which he has dissented and his other
memberships or shares were registered in the
names of different members of shareholders.
7.

Section 3-1-40 (first paragraph):
Merger - Dissent from plan by member of
shareholder - Filing objection to plan Demand for payment for membership or shares
and procedure for payment.
Any member or shareholder electing to exercise
such right of dissent shall file with the
association or corporation, prior to or at the
meeting at which the plan of merger is
submitted to a vote, a written objection to he
plan of merger.
If the plan of merger be
approved by the required vote and if, but only
if, such member of shareholder shall not have
voted in favor thereof, such member or
shareholder may, within ten days after the
date on which vote was taken, make written
demand on the surviving corporation for
payment of the fair value of the interest of
such member or for payment of the fair value
of such shareholder's shares, as the case may
be, and, if the merger is effected, such
corporation shall pay to such member or
shareholder, upon surrender of any certificate
or certificates representing such membership
or such shares, the fair value thereof as of
the day prior to the date on which the vote
was taken approving the plan of merger,
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in
anticipation of such merger. Any member or
shareholder failing to
make such written
objection prior to or at such meeting and
failing to make such demand within the tenday period shall be bound by the terms of the

6

plan of merger.
Any member or shareholder
making such objection and demand shall
thereafter be entitled only to payment as in
this section provided and shall not be
entitled to vote or to exercise any other
rights of a member or shareholder•

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case concerns the procedures used in 1985-86 to combine
corporate agricultural cooperatives, Cache Valley Dairy Association
(CVDA) and Intermountain Milk Producers' Association (IMPA).
The

Plaintiffs

are

directors,

certificates of interest in CVDA.

members

and

holders

of

They sought certification as

representatives of a class of all members and certificate holders.
Plaintiffs

also

sought

to

act

derivatively

for

CVDA.

The

Defendants are the two cooperatives, other directors of CVDA and
legal counsel.
The issues were joined upon presentation of motions for
partial

summary

judgment, Defendants' motion

to dismiss

and

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Significant facts were
undisputed.

The trial court rendered

a Memorandum

Decision

generally determining the legal issues in favor of the Defendants.
Memorandum decision, Appendix B.

Pursuant thereto, Plaintiffs'

Complaint was ordered dismissed and class certification was denied.
Id.

Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial

court's decision in part, reversing it in part and remanding for
7

further

proceedings.

Defendants had

The

Court

of Appeals

found

that

the

failed to follow the requirements of Title 3

relative to merger.

It then assumed for purposes of analysis that

the statutory requirements were mandatory.

The Court of Appeals

affirmed in part because it found the Defendants were barred by
laches.

It reversed in part as to the causes of action alleging

negligence because of insufficient
further proceedings.

findings and remanded

for

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Appendix

A.
The Plaintiffs have filed for a writ of certiorari to this
Court for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action challenges the method and legal basis used to
combine Cache Valley Dairy Associaiton (CVDA) with Intermountain
Milk Producers Association (IMPA), another corporate agricultural
cooperative.

Named as Defendants in the action were CVDA, IMPA,

other directors of CVDA and legal counsel along with various John
Does.
The Complaint alleged that the combination of CVDA and IMPA
was required to follow the statutory procedures set forth in
Section 3-1-30 et seq.

Further that the statutory requirements

were mandatory not permissive or alternative to other procedures.
Verified Complaint, T.R. at 1-26, Appendix G.
Defendants

wholly

failed

to

follow the

8

Further

statutory

that

procedures

requisite to a valid combination.
damages

on

behalf

of

.Id.. The Complaint seeks money

Plaintiffs

and

on

behalf

of

CVDA

or

alternatively, equitable relief.
Defendants admitted that the statutory procedures of Section
3-1-30 et seq. were not followed.
urged

that

the

combination

of

T.R. at 197-198.
the

two

Defendants

cooperatives

was

by

consolidation or transfer of all assets, therefore the procedures
of Section 3-1-30 were not required.

T.R. at 199-200.

Plaintiffs countered that the Notice sent to all members
specifically stated that the combination was to be pursuant to
Section 3-1-30 et seq.:
The Board of Directors of Cache Valley Dairy
Association has adopted a Resolution directing
that a Plan of Merger (Consolidation) under
Section 3-1-30 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated,
be submitted to a vote of the members of Cache
Valley Dairy Association at a special meeting
of members to be held at 10:30 o'clock a.m. on
Monday, December 16, 1985, at the Smithfield
Armory, 10 East Center Street, Smithfield,
Utah.
T.R. at 26, Appendix D.

The Board of Directors of CVDA never

approved any other form or type of combination.

Indeed there were

no Board meetings from December 16, 1985 to December of 1986. T.R.
at 380.
The Plaintiffs stated their claims individually, derivatively
and as a class alleging that there was no valid transfer of assets
to IMPA.

The acts of the Defendants were also alleged to be

negligent and cause for recision of liens or encumbrances on CVDA
property.
The

Verified Complaint, T.R. at 126, Appendix Document G.
Defendants

filed

a

motion
9

to

dismiss,

alleging

inconsistent causes of action because the complaint requested both
direct and derivative relief in addition to money damages and
recision.
at 117,

T.R. at 91. Plaintiffs responded to that motion.

T.R.

Apparently, the trial court's final order is not based

upon this motion or the grounds stated therein.
The Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
the central issue alleging that Defendants were required to follow
the statutory procedures set out in Section 3-1-30 et seq. T.R. at
48.

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs urged that the Defendants were

estopped from using any other procedure because of the language of
the Notice sent.

JEd.

Alternatively, Defendants had to follow

either the corporate procedures

for merger, consolidation or

transfer of all assets or the common law.

Ici.

The Defendants

responded to Plaintiffs' motion with a cross motion for summary
judgment alleging there is no statutory procedure required other
than Board approval.
The

trial

T.R. at 247.

court entered

a brief

and

somewhat

confusing

memorandum decision addressing all the motions collectively.
at 55 2; Appendix B.
follow

the

The decision found Defendants had failed to

statutory

cooperatives.

T.R.

procedures

for

merger

of

agricultural

Further that the Notice was defective if a merger

or consolidation of agricultural cooperatives was contemplated.
However, the trial court found that the statutory procedures were
not an exclusive alternative

for combination

of agricultural

cooperatives. Ld. The trial court found that a transfer of assets
had occurred and that procedure was not covered by the statute.
10

The trial court stated that Plaintiffs might claim money damages
but had not asked for them.

The trial court found the remedies of

recision and restitution would not be allowed because of laches.
Based upon these rulings the court proposed to dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint without prejudice to filing a request for money damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There was no evidentiary hearing held in this matter.

The

trial court failed to provide a record of what it determined
material and undisputed, however, in significant part the facts
were undisputed.
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment included a
statement of relevant facts broken into twelve separate statements
with specific reference to the Verified Complaint as support for
the same.

Defendants responded to that statement by admitting or

clarifying each such statement.

In the absence of a better record

by the trial court the combination of this interchange provides
the Court with the undisputed facts.

T.R. at 52-54, 197-199,

Appendix H.
Subsequently, Defendant tendered a document they labeled as
being "Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts"
same in Paragraphs 1 through 39.
responded

T.R. at 140-151.

Plaintiffs

admitting, denying and/or clarifying the same with

Plaintiffs' Affidavits.

This provided some additional facts on

which the trial court could base its decision.
The

numbering the

Defendants'

Statement

and

T.R. at 227-238.

Plaintiffs' Response with the
11

interchange as to each fact is included in its entirety. Appendix

Subsequently, on June 29, 1987, the trial court rendered a
memorandum decision.

T.R. at 552.

The Defendants tendered a

proposed order to the court to which Plaintiffs duly objected.
T.R. at 555. The basis of the objection was the failure to provide
findings of fact and conclusions of law or clarification regarding
the general

findings, legal conclusions

certification.

and denial

of class

Over Defendants' objections the court entered the

order as presented.

T.R. at 586; Appendix B.

It is from that Order that the Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals

summarizes its view of the decision of the trial court as follows:
With this in mind, we first consider whether, on the
undisputed facts before it, the trial court correctly
determined that respondents were entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on appellants' first, second, and fifth
causes of action for rescission because of laches. See,
e.g., D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).
For purposes of analysis, we will assume that the
merger provisions found in Sections 3-1-30 to -41 applied
to the transaction by which CVDA's operations, assets,
and liabilities were taken over by IMPA, even though
respondents characterize the transaction as something
other than a merger. We interpret sections 3-1-30 to 41 as creating individual rights in the members of an
agricultural cooperative to enforce the* mandated
procedures and member vote requirements for accomplishing
a merger.
Opinion at 9 (footnotes omitted) Appendix A. The Court of Appeals,
having interpreted the trial court's decision in this manner,
proceeded to find the Plaintiffs' claims barred by laches.
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ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

First Question Presented:

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY

DETERMINE THE RIGHTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
WHICH MERGE AS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SET FORTH IN SECTION 3-1-30 ET
SEQ., UCA?
There are numerous agricultural cooperative associations in
the State of Utah.

Most of the agricultural producers of this

State are members of one or more agricultural cooperatives.

The

State of Utah recognizes agricultural cooperatives as a distinct
and different type of legal entity providing a specific statutory
framework within which they operate.

Title 3, UCA 1953.

A significant part of Title 3 governs the method in which
those specialized entities are to merge or combine.

There are

specific and detailed procedures governing who is a member for
purposes of voting for or dissenting from a merger.
3-1-33 (second paragraph).
proxies is controlled.

See Section

The method of voting and the use of

Id. at Sections 34 and 35. The procedure

for filing articles of merger is described.

Id. at Section 36.

Members who dissent to the merger are given the right to have fair
value paid to them.

Id. at Section 37.

In this case an agricultural cooperative association combined
with another but denies that it is subject to the regulatory
procedure or any other corporate regulatory procedure whatsoever.
All this despite an actual written notice given that it would
13

follow the procedures set forth in Section 3-1-30 et seq. Notice,
Appendix D.

This cooperative now states openly, and the trial

court and the Court of Appeals so found, that it followed none of
the statutory procedures and further that it is not required to.
See Decision at 2, Appendix B: Opinion at 5 Appendix A.
The trial court expressly confirmed

the position of the

Defendants herein, finding that an agricultural cooperative even
with this Notice is not required to follow the statutory procedure.
The cooperative could transfer all of its assets but then the
members might have an action for damages.

Id.

The trial court's ruling is clear in one respect and very
confusing in another.

Clearly the trial court found that the

statutory procedure was not required. However, it is confusing in
that it suggests there is a possible claim for damages on behalf
of members and producers because of a transfer of assets.
states that no such claim was made.

It then

The Complaint makes that

request for money damages at paragraphs 36-40.

Appendix G.

Only in considering the equitable remedies of rescission and
restitution does the trial court make any reference to laches.
Laches does not form a basis of the trial court's decision to
dismiss.

Instead the trial court is indicating that by reason of

laches certain remedies will not be considered.

The trial court

is dismissing because it finds the combination is not improper as
the statutory procedure is not required.
The Court of Appeals, mischaracterizes the decision of the
trial court as being a judgment against Plaintiffs based upon the
14

affirmative defense of laches as proven by undisputed facts.
Opinion at 9 Appendix A.

Evidently the Court of Appeals does

disagree with the trial court, finding that these statutes do give
individual members rights "to enforce the mandated procedures and
member vote requirements".

Id. at 9.

The Court of Appeals proceeds to affirm in part the trial
court by relying on laches. A careful reading of the trial court's
decision indicates that the trial judge did not find that laches
barred these causes of action only that it barred some forms of
relief, i.e. rescission and restitution.

He expressly found that

the Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to seek damages.

The

trial judge erred because Plaintiffs were seeking money damages
but his reasoning about laches is sound.

Certainly a court of

equity can restrict forms of relief because of the presence of
laches. The Court of Appeals has expanded the trial judge's ruling
about forms of relief into being dispositive of the case.
As the record now sits it is unclear whether agricultural
cooperative associations are required to comply with Sections 31-30 et seq.

Even in this very case there has been no ruling on

that central issue yet the case is being remanded for further
proceedings.

The large number of agricultural cooperatives and

their members are left in a state of confusion. Indeed if Sections
3-1-30 et seq. can be disregarded, can other Sections of Title 3
be disregarded as well. This is an important question of state law
"which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court."
43R. Utah S. Ct.
15

Rule

An important question regarding corporate democracy within
multi million dollar cooperatives is unsettled. State law is being
either disregarded or is not applicable. Twice during the pendency
of this case the litigants and others have lobbied the legislature
to clarify state law on this issue. It is suggested that the state
legislature does not want to consider remedial legislation until
the application of present law is clarified.

Second Question Presented:

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING

A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL UPON LACHES:
(a)

ERR IN THAT THE FACTS RELATIVE TO DELAY AND REASONS FOR
DELAY WERE MATERIALLY DISPUTED AND SHOW GENUINE ISSUES
OF FACT; AND,

(b)

ERR IN THAT THE DEFENDANT IMPA HAD FORMALLY ABANDONED THE
MERGER;

The Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court in
part is based upon its finding of laches.

Because of a motion to

dismiss, Defendants were never required to file an answer to
Plaintiff's Complaint and plead laches as an affirmative defense.
The

trial

court's

interposition

only

ruling

as

to

of other parties would

remedies of rescission and restitution.
J3.

laches

was

that

the

foreclose the equitable
Decision at 2: Appendix

The Court of Appeals, however, based its partial affirmation

upon its findings of laches so as to justify a partial summary
judgment as to the First, Second and Fifth Causes of Action.

It

finds the facts are undisputed as to this affirmative defense. In
16

so doing the Court of Appeals itself must and has become the fact
finder

adjudicating

disputed

interpreting various events.

facts, assessing

and

The trial court never made these

findings and the factual basis generated
entirely new.

knowledge

for this ruling is

In so doing the Court of Appeals makes numerous

errors.
(a)

The very facts relied upon by the Court of Appeals are

contested:
The Plaintiffs by Verified Complaint stated that no plan of
merger or Articles of Merger were ever approved by the Board of
CVDA. Verified Complaint at 5 and 6; Appendix G.
verified

that

they relied

upon

the advice of

Plaintiffs also
legal counsel

believing and being told that they were properly following the
statutory merger procedures.

Id. at 13;

Interchange of Facts at 12; Appendix I.

See also, Defendants
The Court of Appeals

assumes that the Letter of Intent initiated a merger.
12; Appendix A.

Opinion at

Plaintiffs responded to this allegation in the

trial court reciting the language of this Letter of Intent and
adding sworn statements.

See Letter of Intent Paragraphs 6, 21,

Appendix E; Defendants' Interchanges of Facts 7-11, Appendix I.
All of the allegations regarding the intermingling of CVDA and IMPA
and the possibility of separation were squarely contested with
sworn affidavits. See Interchange of Facts 13, 17-39; Appendix I.

(b)

IMPA itself formally abondoned the merger:

On December 17, 1985 the Board of IMPA passed a written
17

resolution which stated the merger was abandoned and a combination
would be done in a different way.
Appendix F.

IMPA Resolution of 12/17/85?

There is no evidence this abandonment was ever

communicated to Plaintiffs in any way. The alternate procedure is
completely without CVDA board involvement.

The mechanics and the

content of the transfer was designed by IMPA and Mr. Wilson.

The

argument is made that it is equivalent to what was approved.
Unfortunately discovery never progressed to the point where the
written Plan of Merger referred to in the Notice was discovered.
This written Plan itself was never reviewed nor approved by the
CVDA board despite reference to it in the Notice.
Appendix D.

Notice, See

The only content as to what the terms of merger are

is contained in the Summary of Merger attached to the Notice. That
description is vague and concludes by simply saying and "all other
provisions of the Agreement of Merger."
paragraph 2, Appendix D.

Summary of Merger,

The fact is that since IMPA voided or

abandoned the merger, an alternative method was chosen and the only
terms of merger are what is what is said in the IMPA minutes.
There is no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs were informed
of this Resolution until after this litigation began. Assets were
transferred,

some

in

February

and

some

in August

of

1986.

Plaintiffs thought and were told a statutory merger was approved.
The Court of Appeals assumes and finds knowledgeable participation
by the Plaintiffs when their sworn affidavits allege that they were
not knowledgeable participants.
attorney.

They were misled by the IMPA

Material information was withheld from them.
18

The transfer of assets was completed in August of 1986. After
various

efforts

to

resolve

the problem

by

Plaintiffs filed this suit in February of 1987,

other means

the

They acted within

a few months which is reasonable under the circumstances.

The

Court of Appeals errs by entering the role of fact finder and
adjudicator.
This activity by the Court of Appeals departs from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

If it needed

findings of fact relative to laches, the proper course would have
been to remand to the trial court to make such adjudications. This
activity compounds the error of the trial court. All of this goes
back to the trial court's refusal to enter proper findings and
conclusions.

The Court of Appeals and this Court must require

trial courts to describe and support their rulings.
Appeals should not arrogate that role to itself.

The Court of
This Court by

granting a Writ of Certiorari will allow the Plaintiffs to fully
brief that erroneous pattern herein and correct an injustice done
in the immediate case.
the need

It will also allow the Court to reaffirm

for proper adudication and documentation of factual

findings.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this Court to grant a Writ of
Certiorari.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.
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N. George Daines

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was mailed this

day of

January, 1990 to the following:
R. Brent Stephens
Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone (801) 521-9000

N. George
BARRETT &
108 North
Logan, UT
Telephone

Daines
DAINES
Main, Suite 200
84321
(801) 753-4000

Kevin E. Kane
MAREK & YARBRO
300 Western Bank Building
P.O. Box 15066
Las Cruces, N.M. 88004
Telephone (505) 526-8682

J. Anthony Eyre
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
32 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 521-3773

Attorneys for Appellants
M. David Eckersley
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 532-0453
Roger P. Christensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 355-3431
James C. Jenkins
JENKINS, McKEAN & ASSOCIATES
67 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (801) 752-4107
Attorneys for Respondents
N. George Daines
D902/6381

21

